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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LOGAN CITY,

j

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
LOWELL D. CARLSEN,

|

Case No. 920739-CA

j

Case Type: Appeal

\

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant. J

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953 as
amended.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Logan Municipal Code Section 9.24.040 is in

conflict with general state law, or is repugnant to state law,
and based thereon whether Appellant's conviction of violating the
same should be overturned.
2.

Whether the trial court's treatment of Appellant's

motion to dismiss and Appellee's motion to amend the information
prejudiced appellant or violated his substantial rights.
3.

Whether Appellant is precluded from challenging the
1

constitutionality of Logan Municipal Code section 9.24.040.

And

if Appellant is not so precluded is the ordinance
unconstitutionally vague and therefore void.
4.

Whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to

sustain the jury verdict.
5.

Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose

sentence because of a delay in sentencing that went well beyond
30 days following the trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with furnishing tobacco to a minor
under the age of 19 years old, in violation of Logan Municipal
Code section 9.24.040.
A jury trial was held in this matter on the 16th day of
January, 1992 in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in
and for the County of Cache, Logan City Department, the Honorable
Roger Bean presiding.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

The court entered

judgment on the 6th day of October, 1992.
Appellant is appealing from that verdict and judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The transcript lists the testimony of Appellant and 2 of the
Prosecutions 4 witnesses, therefore, critical facts are omitted
in the transcript, however a brief list of the critical,
uncontroverted facts are as follows:
1.

Jerren Barson, a 16 year-old boy, acting under the

direction of the State Health Department and the Logan City
2

Police department attempted to purchase cigarettes from 20 stores
in Logan City during a routine compliance check.

(Transcript

p.71, 75.)
2.

At Appellant's business Appellant, Lowell Carlsen, sold

cigarettes to him.
3.

(Transcript p.73, 98, 101.)

None of the other 19 business sold cigarettes to Jerren

Barson despite his requests for the same.
4.

(Transcript p.75.)

With respect to the interaction Jerren Barson had with

Lowell Carlsen, Jerren testified as follows: "I went up there and
asked for a pack of Camel Lights and he [Appellant] goes, sare
you 19?' And I didn't say nothing.

Then he just gave them to me

with a pack of matches, and then I went back to the car."
(Transcript p.7 3.)
5.

With respect to Jerren's testimony referred to above in

paragraph no.4, Lowell Carlsen's only dispute was that he
testified Jerren lied about his age indicating he was 19.
(Transcript p.95.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant has not met his burden on any of the points he
raises to justify receiving any favorable treatment from this
court.
ARGUMENT
I
LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 9.24.040 IS NOT IN
CONFLICT WITH GENERAL STATE LAW, IS NOT REPUGNANT TO
STATE LAW, AND THEREFORE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF
VIOLATING THE SAME SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Municipal corporations have authority from the State
3

Constitution to adopt and enforce ordinances "not in conflict
with the general law . . . ." Article XI, Sec. 5.

The

Legislature has further granted to cities and towns power to
"pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not
repugnant to law . . . ."

U.C.A. Sec. 10-8-84 (1953 as amended.)

A municipality can enact and enforce ordinances that are
consistent with relevant state law.
This appeal presents a case where the Logan City ordinance
enforced against Appellant is consistent in every respect with
state law except for the penalty provision codified under a
different title.
Appellant was prosecuted and found guilty by a jury of
furnishing tobacco to a minor in violation of Logan Municipal
Code Sec. 9.24.040 which provides that "It is unlawful for any
person to sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco
in any form to any person under nineteen years of age."
ordinance does not specify a penalty.

The

However, in section

1.16.010 the following general penalty provision is given: "All
violations of this municipal code for which no lesser penalties
are provided, are classified as class B misdemeanors, punishable
by a fine not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
The comparable statute under Utah law is found in U.C.A.
Sec. 76-10-104 (1953 as amended) which provides in almost
identical language to the city ordinance: "Any person who sells,
4

gives, or furnishes any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form,
to any person under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C
misdemeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor on the
second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on subsequent
offenses."
The Appellant was charged as a first offense.

Under the

city penalty provision the offense is a class B misdemeanor but
under state law is a class C misdemeanor.

Appellee admits that

the city penalty provision, section 1.16.010, is void or
unenforceable because it is not consistent with general state
law.

Appellee maintains, however, that the separate ordinance

which defines the objectional conduct, which Appellant was found
guilty of violating, section 9.24.040, is completely consistent
with state law and should not be held invalid
A.

UNDER THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN ALLGOOD V.
LARSON SECTION 9.24.040 OF THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE
SHOULD BE FOUND VALID AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
UPHELD.
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with a situation similar to the

immediate case in Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976.)
In Allgood. the defendant was arrested, charged and convicted of
trespassing under a Salt Lake City ordinance.

The city ordinance

provides "that it shall be unlawful for any person to walk upon
the premises of another without permission of the owner or
occupant."

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City section 32-3-3.

Like the immediate case, the Salt Lake City trespassing ordinance
does not provide for a penalty.

However, section 26-1-8 of the

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City provides that when there is
5

no other penalty prescribed, the person "shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding $299, or imprisonment in the city jail for a
period not longer than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment."
The trespass Allgood engaged in is an infraction under state
law which clearly cannot result in imprisonment,
6-206(3).

U.C.A. sec. 76-

Allgood was, however, under the city ordinance,

sentenced to six months in jail.

On a habeas corpus preceding

the district court ordered that Allgood be released from custody.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's action and
held: "if the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the
general law of the state covering the same subject, the ordinance
penalty is void.

The charter or ordinance penalty cannot exceed

that of the state law."

Allgood, 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Emphasis

added.)
The court in Allgood, as Appellant in the immediate case
concedes, did not find the trespass ordinance, section 32-3-3,
void but merely the separate penalty provision, section 26-1-8,
which provided for jail time.
In the immediate case Appellant's attorney moved the court
to dismiss the charges based on the inconsistency between the
state and city penalty provisions.

The trial court Judge, Rodger

Bean, denied the motion but, consistent with Allgood, determined
the city penalty provision was invalid and sentenced Appellant
under general state law as a class C misdemeanor.
believed there was no prejudice to Appellant.
6

The court

(Sentencing

Transcript p.8)
Appellant's sentence was to pay a $300.00 fine (including
the state assessment) and serve 30 days in jail.

The judge put

Appellant on 6 months informal probation and agreed to suspend
$100.00 of the fine and all the jail time upon successful
completion of probation.
From every perspective, Defendant has been treated as though
he committed a class C misdemeanor.

The Verdict form signed by

the jury foreperson, included in Appellant's brief, shows he was
convicted of a class C Misdemeanor.
C misdemeanor.

His sentence was for a class

He has received all benefits of the more lenient

law, the state law.

There has been no prejudice against him or

violation of any of his substantial rights.
B.

A SAVINGS CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE
WORKS TO FURTHER PROTECT THE VALIDITY OF THE CITY
TOBACCO ORDINANCE.
Section 1.01.100 of the Logan Municipal Code provides for

the severability of the penalty provision, section 1.16.010, in
order to protect the substantive provision, section 9.24.040,
which makes furnishing tobacco to minors a criminal offense.
Section 1.01.100 provides:
If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of
this code is for any reason held to be invalid or
unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portions of this code. The
council declares that it would have passed this code, and
each section, subsection, sentence, clause and phrase
thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more
sections, subsections, sentences, clauses or phrases had
been declared invalid or unconstitutional, and if for any
reason this code should be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the original ordinance or ordinances shall
7

be in full force and effect.
Even though the Code suggests it is acceptable to remove
objectionable clauses and phrases within a section or subsection
this court is not asked to do that. All of section 9.24.040 is
consistent with general state law and should be upheld.

Section

1.16.010 is admittedly inconsistent and should be voided in this
case.
II
THE TRIAL COURT'S TREATMENT OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION
DID NOT PREJUDICE APPELLANT OR VIOLATE HIS SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS.
During the trial, Appellant moved the court for it's order
dismissing the information filed against Appellant because of the
conflict, discussed above, between the penalty provision of the
city ordinance and the relevant state statute.

In response to

Appellant's motion Appellee offered to amend the information to
change the charge from a city ordinance to state statute.

It was

discussed that such a motion would also require amending the
plaintiff from the City to the State. The court took both
parties' motions under advisement and in the interest of the
witnesses' and jury's time proceeded with the trial.

(Transcript

p.48-53, 58-68.)
The motion to dismiss was raised again at the conclusion of
the presentation of Appellee's case. And, again, Appellee's
proposed amendment was discussed.

The court indicated that it

would tentatively grant the prosecution's motion to amend the
information in order to get the factual questions to the jury.
8

The court made it clear however that the motions were still under
advisement,

(Transcript p.88-92.)

At the conclusion of the case, and before actually deciding
the parties motions, the court instructed the jury in the
following fashion:
There are a couple of things we've done. We've amended
the pleading to show State of Utah as the plaintiff.
We won't explain to you all of the reasons for this.
It shows State of Utah as the plaintiff in the action
rather than Logan City. Mr. Wyatt's role here is a
representative of the State of Utah, and that's
permitted under the statute at this present time.
Another change is that the offense is a Class C
misdemeanor, and you'll be instructed in these
instructions to that effect rather than a Class B
misdemeanor.
(Transcript p.109.)
At the conclusion of the trial the court indicated it would
announce a decision on the 2 motions, both Appellant's motion to
dismiss and Appellee's motion to amend, at sentencing which was
to be set at some time in the future.

(Transcript p.112-13.)

At sentencing the court denied both motions including
Appellee's motion to amend. (Sentencing Transcript p.4.)

The

result was that the information was never actually amended.

It

was suggested to the jury that the amendment was granted when the
court told the jury that it changed the plaintiff to the State
and the charge to a class C misdemeanor.

The court did not

explain to the jury the basis for what it was doing to avoid
confusion.
Appellant's argument here is that it was improper to grant
Appellant's motion to amend.

The argument is misplaced as the
9

court did not grant such a motion.

The Appellant's only real

argument here would be that he was prejudiced in some significant
way by the court's telling the jury the plaintiff had been
changed from the City to the State even though it had not.
Appellee's position here is that the court's conduct in
tentatively granting the motion, while keeping it under
advisement, and then actually denying the motion did not
prejudice the defendant or violate any of his substantial rights.
Ill
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE 9.24.040
Defendant raises for the first time on this appeal a claim
that the ordinance he was charged and convicted with is
unconstitutionally vague. Appellant did not raise this issue at
trial, and therefore, should be precluded from doing so here.
Nevertheless, if the court chooses to allow him to raise the
argument here Appellee maintains the ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague.
A.

APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO RAISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO THE CITY ORDINANCE DURING THE TRIAL
PRECLUDES HIM FROM DOING SO ON THIS APPEAL.
Case law is clear: "Generally, a defendant who fails to

bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it
initially on appeal.

Utah's appellate courts have applied this

rule to constitutional questions advanced for the first time on
appeal."

State v. Archambeau, 820 P,2d 920, 921 (Utah App.

1991.)
The fact that Appellant did not raise this issue at trial
10

should preclude him from raising it at this late date. The
courts have, however, two limited exceptions to the general rule
barring Appellant from raising an issue for the first time on
appeal.

The first exception is if the trial court committed

"plain error;1' the second is if there are "exceptional
circumstances."
1.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 921.

THIS IS NOT A CASE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Appellant argues there are "exceptional circumstances"
because he was "not given adequate notice that he would be
prosecuted under the statute."

(Brief p.30.)

Appellant is

apparently claiming that the so-called amendment, which was not
actually granted, to change the charge from City ordinance to
State statute created the exceptional circumstances. Appellant
was prosecuted and tried for violating the City ordinance, the
same ordinance the original information alleged he violated.
Even if the information had been amended to state statute the
language of the prohibited conduct in the two ordinances are
virtually identical.

(See discussion above.)

It is Appellee's

position that this is not exceptional circumstances as
contemplated by Utah courts.
2.

THIS IS NOT A CASE OF PLAIN ERROR.

Appellant also argues "plain error" by concluding the court
committed plain error. Appellant does not however, offer
anything specific as to what the plain error was.
None of the Appellant's substantial rights were violated
here.

His liberty interests are not a stake. Appellant should
11

be precluded for raising this issue for the first time on appeal.
B.

LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 9.24.040 IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE OR AS APPLIED TO
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Even though Appellant should not be allowed to raise the

issue of the constitutionally of the ordinance, Appellee
maintains it is not unconstitutionally vague.
Appellant has a difficult burden here.

"Legislative

enactments are presumed to be constitutional, those who challenge
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of
demonstrating its unconstitutionally."

Greenwood v. North Salt

Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991)
In Greenwood the court provides guidance for a challenge of
vagueness.

"In challenging the ordinance on its face, plaintiffs

must show that it is 'invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of
any valid application . . . .' Unless the enactment is vague in
all its applications, it is ordinarily not unconstitutional on
its face.

in that case, we must then determine whether the

ordinance is vague in its application to the facts of the case."
817 P.2d at 819.

(Citations omitted, Emphasis added.)

Appellant has not met his burden of showing the ordinance is
vague in all its applications therefore the court should find it
is not unconstitutional on its face. Further it is not vague in
its application to the facts of this immediate case.

The city

ordinance and state statute both clearly prohibit selling tobacco
to a minor under 19 years or age.
It is uncontroverted that Appellant knowingly sold tobacco
12

to Jerren Barson, a boy who was 16 years old.

Appellee's

position is that Appellant knew the boy was not old enough to
have cigarettes but sold them to him anyway.

And that the jury

believed the boy was telling the truth when he testified that
Appellant asked him how old he was but he did not respond to the
question.

It is uncontroverted that Appellant did not ask for

identification to help him make such a determination.
(Transcript p.102.)

Appellant apparently claims he reasonably

tried to find out the boy's age through questions and was
satisfied he was old enough. Appellee maintains that the jury
did not accept this story and found him guilty.
It is significant that the boy testified he went to 20
stores, ten on the same day and ten on another day, and attempted
to purchase cigarettes from all of them—but only one, the
Appellant—sold to him.

(Transcript p.71, 75.)
IV

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
To make a successful argument based on sufficiency of
evidence the appellant is obligated to "[1] marshall all the
evidence supporting the verdict and then [2] demonstrate that,
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support it." Cambelt
International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987.)
Appellant has failed to meet this burden.

13

A.

APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE JURY VERDICT.
First, Appellant has failed to marshall all the evidence

supporting the verdict. Appellee called 4 witnesses: Jerren
Barson a 16 year-old boy (Transcript p.70-79), Officer J.G. Geier
(Transcript p.79-87) and Gil Duron (Transcript p.70) of the Logan
City Police Department and Todd Barson (Transcript p.69) of the
State Health Department.

All four witnesses provided evidence in

support of the jury verdict. Appellant's brief only discusses
Jerren Barson in two sentences and a brief mention to J.G. Geier
in one sentence. (Brief p.40.)
Appellant has not even provided this court with a complete
transcript of the testimony of Appellee's witnesses. The
transcript indicates that Gil Duron and Todd Barson testified but
their testimony was not transcribed.

(p.69-70.)

The fact that Appellant has failed to provide the court with
a complete transcript is fatal to his argument here.

In Cornish

Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988),, Roller made an argument
similar to Appellant's in the immediate case.

Like this

Appellant, Roller did not provide the court with a complete
transcript.

The court stated that, "Rollers have failed to

provide the Court with the entire transcript of the proceedings
below.

This Court has repeatedly held that an appellant may not

succeed on a claim of error when relevant portions of the record
are not before us; in such a case, the proceedings before the
trial court are presumed to support the trial court's findings.
14

Cornish, 758 P.2d 919, 921. (Emphasis added.)
B.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, EVEN VIEWING
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THAT
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT IT.
The Utah Supreme Court said in Cambelt that "The burden on

an appellant to establish that the evidence does not support the
jury's verdict and the factual findings implicit in that verdict
under such a circumstance is quite heavy.

We consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we will
not overturn that verdict when it is supported by substantial and
competent evidence."

745 P.2d 1239, 1241. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the jury verdict shows the jury
had a reasonable basis to find Appellant guilty.
Appellee's witness Jerren Barson testified that "I went up
there and asked for a pack of Camel Lights and he [Appellant]
goes, 'are you 19?' And I didn't say nothing.

Then he just gave

them to me with a pack of matches, and then I went back to the
car."

(Transcript p.73.)

That testimony, particularly in light

of what the other witness testified to, remembering that there is
no transcript of two of the prosecutions witnesses' testimony, is
substantial and competent and supports the jury verdict.
Appellant agreed with Jerren's testimony.
the cigarettes to him.

He agreed that he sold

He testified that he did not ask for

verification of his age by requesting to see Jerren Barson's
drivers license. Appellant's only disagreement is that he said
Jerren Barson told him he was old enough to purchase the
cigarettes.

(Transcript p.101-02.)
15

Appellant's own testimony

supports the verdict of guilty.
The jury found Appellant guilty of selling tobacco to a
minor.

The evidence supported that finding and this court should

uphold the verdict.
V
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED WITHIN 30
DAYS FOLLOWING THE TRIAL.
Appellant admits in his Brief that he consented to being
sentenced later than thirty days following the trial.

(p.42-43.)

Appellant then asked to continue the dated set for sentencing
even further because of a conflict in Appellant's attorney's
schedule which the court accommodated.

Judge Bean explains the

facts surrounding the sentencing date in his memorandum decision
attached as an exhibit to Appellant's brief.
To void Appellant's sentence because of his waiver and then
the scheduling conflict of his and his own attorney's making
would not serve justice.

The court acted properly in sentencing

Appellant because of Appellant's waiver to the 30-day period and
then subsequent motion for continuance.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the conviction of Appellant should
stand.
DATED this /2—day of August, 1993.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid to Appellant Lowell
D. Carlsen at 720 North 400 East, Logan, Utah 84321 this
day of August, 1993.
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